Privacy Preserving Probabilistic Record Linkage (P3RL): a novel method for linking existing health-related data and maintaining participant confidentiality by Kurt Schmidlin et al.
Schmidlin et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology  (2015) 15:46 
DOI 10.1186/s12874-015-0038-6RESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessPrivacy Preserving Probabilistic Record
Linkage (P3RL): a novel method for linking
existing health-related data and maintaining
participant confidentiality
Kurt Schmidlin1, Kerri M. Clough-Gorr1,2, and Adrian Spoerri1* for the SNC study groupAbstract
Background: Record linkage of existing individual health care data is an efficient way to answer important
epidemiological research questions. Reuse of individual health-related data faces several problems: Either a unique
personal identifier, like social security number, is not available or non-unique person identifiable information, like
names, are privacy protected and cannot be accessed. A solution to protect privacy in probabilistic record linkages
is to encrypt these sensitive information. Unfortunately, encrypted hash codes of two names differ completely if the
plain names differ only by a single character. Therefore, standard encryption methods cannot be applied. To
overcome these challenges, we developed the Privacy Preserving Probabilistic Record Linkage (P3RL) method.
Methods: In this Privacy Preserving Probabilistic Record Linkage method we apply a three-party protocol, with two
sites collecting individual data and an independent trusted linkage center as the third partner. Our method consists
of three main steps: pre-processing, encryption and probabilistic record linkage. Data pre-processing and encryption
are done at the sites by local personnel. To guarantee similar quality and format of variables and identical encryption
procedure at each site, the linkage center generates semi-automated pre-processing and encryption templates. To
retrieve information (i.e. data structure) for the creation of templates without ever accessing plain person identifiable
information, we introduced a novel method of data masking. Sensitive string variables are encrypted using Bloom
filters, which enables calculation of similarity coefficients. For date variables, we developed special encryption
procedures to handle the most common date errors. The linkage center performs probabilistic record linkage with
encrypted person identifiable information and plain non-sensitive variables.
Results: In this paper we describe step by step how to link existing health-related data using encryption methods
to preserve privacy of persons in the study.
Conclusion: Privacy Preserving Probabilistic Record linkage expands record linkage facilities in settings where a
unique identifier is unavailable and/or regulations restrict access to the non-unique person identifiable information
needed to link existing health-related data sets. Automated pre-processing and encryption fully protect sensitive
information ensuring participant confidentiality. This method is suitable not just for epidemiological research but
also for any setting with similar challenges.
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Record linkage of existing individual health-related data
is a time and cost efficient way to answer important
epidemiologic research questions. For example, survival
studies linking federally collected mortality data with
existing clinical cohorts or population-based disease
registries provide quick thorough participant follow-up
without cumbersome and expensive patient contact
[1, 2]. Given rapidly increasing low cost computing
power, these types of digital data (even very large
datasets) can be easily combined for new research ob-
jectives using record linkage.
Unfortunately, today much of the available existing
health-related data is primarily collected for specific pur-
poses under strict privacy protection regulation. A major
challenge for data reuse is that regulations commonly
prohibit disclosure of discriminating personal identifying
information ([PII], e.g. name, address, social security
number [SSN], date of birth [DOB]). PII is any data that
is considered potentially unique to a person’s identity.
Only recently in Switzerland was a SSN introduced
nationally. Although older Swiss datasets include non-
unique PII and newer datasets have SSN, neither can be
used across settings due to legal restrictions. This creates
an intractable challenge for researchers who want to
take advantage of the efficiencies of reusing existing
health-related data [3, 4].
Generally, probabilistic record linkage methodology is
applied [5–7] to combine two (or more) datasets if no
unique identifier is available. Records are linked based
on commonly stored non-unique variables available in
both datasets. Commonly used linkage variables are
names, DOB, address, sex, nationality and marital status.
For each pair of records, the likelihood of referring to
the same individual is calculated using weights for each
linkage variable, allowing for typical data errors. A solu-
tion to protect privacy in probabilistic record linkages is
to encrypt PII. Unfortunately, encrypted hash codes of
two names differ completely if the plain names differ
only by a single character. Therefore, standard encryp-
tion methods cannot be applied. Encryption methods
specifically for probabilistic record linkage have been
widely researched [8–13]. Bloom filters [14–19] have
been shown to be a useful and efficient privacy preserv-
ing encrypting method suitable for probabilistic record
linkage projects. They enable calculation of the similarity
of encrypted variables and therefore allow linkage in
spite of typos and other errors existing in any dataset.
In response to these challenges we developed Privacy
Preserving Probabilistic Record Linkage (P3RL). The aim
of P3RL is to reliably link individual health-related data
for new research objectives without breach of participant
confidentiality (i.e. revealing PII). P3RL has the potential
to transform epidemiologic research by making availablevast amounts of health-related data anonymously and
thus heretofore not previously accessible. In this paper
we describe the P3RL method developed for use in
health-related research settings in Switzerland. However,




Figure 1 gives an overview of the P3RL method. P3RL is
appropriate for settings where sites collect individual
health-related data on the same persons without a com-
mon unique identifier (ID) and with regulations restrict-
ing access to non-unique PII. In this paper, we use a two
site example (site A&B). In P3RL, probabilistic record
linkage with encrypted non-unique PII (e.g. names,
DOB, date of death [DOD], address) and plain linkage
variables (e.g. gender, marital status, nationality) are used
to combine the data from sites A and B. P3RL utilizes a
trusted linkage center (site C) [20]. The linkage center is
an independent partner with stringent ethical guidelines
and up-to-date privacy safeguards. It performs P3RL
using only linkage variables (encrypted PII and plain
demographic variables without health-related informa-
tion). Site C is not involved in data collection or analyses,
has no direct access to the individual records at site A or
B and never sees PII in plain text. This is in keeping with
Kelman et al.’s best practice protocol [21]. The output
from P3RL is a link table containing only mapped site IDs
(e.g. site A ID 1234 = site B ID 789). The link table is used
to combine the records from the individual sites into a
dataset tailored for the defined research objectives. The
analysis of the linked data – which is not covered by this
paper – can either be done at site A, B or at a specific ana-
lysis center (site D), depending on the project design and
legal permissions.
Figure 2 shows the flow of data between sites and the
sites responsible for the individual steps included in our
P3RL method. P3RL consists of three main steps: pre-
processing, encryption and probabilistic record linkage.
Data pre-processing and encryption are done at the data
custodian sites (site A and B) by authorized local
personnel. Creating pre-processing and encryption tem-
plates, encryption validation and probabilistic record
linkage are done at the linkage site (site C).
Pre-processing
Pre-processing is a crucial step in record linkage [22–30].
The aim of pre-processing is to harmonize the linkage var-
iables at each site to make them directly comparable and
thus easier to link. Pre-processing includes three steps:
masking (site A&B), creating pre-processing templates
(site C) and data cleaning (site A&B). Using masking, the
linkage center creates custom pre-processing templates
Fig. 1 Basic steps of Privacy Preserving Probabilistic Record Linkage (P3RL)
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supplied to the individual sites allowing them to perform
standardized data cleaning procedures that result in link-
age variables with similar data quality and harmonized
formats.
Masking
Masking is used to disclose the individual site data
structures to site C without revealing PII. The masked
data are used to create the site-specific pre-processing
templates. Data for building pre-processing templates
are exported to site C as masked alone or masked and
additionally shuffled depending on site restrictions.
Figure 3 illustrates examples of the masking and shuf-
fling procedures.
The aim of masking is to alter the plain text variables
so they are no longer readable. Masking replaces
numeric characters between “1 and 9” with “9”, lowerFig. 2 Flowchart of Privacy Preserving Probabilistic Record Linkage (P3RL) mcase alpha characters “a to z” with “z” and upper case “A
to Z” with “Z”. Some characters are left untouched. For
example, first characters of fields, numeric character zero,
special or language specific characters (e.g., ä é - () &) and
spaces are unchanged. Masking of linkage variables is per-
formed at the individual sites based on a pre-determined
sample number of records or the entire population (de-
pending on project-specific restrictions). Masking informs
the data cleaning procedures by hinting at data errors, like
numbers in name fields, characters in a numeric field or
special codes for missing data (e.g., 9, 99, −, .) and reveals
language of text, number of names (surnames, first names)
in a single variable, separators, special characters (e.g.
language specific) and date formats.
Shuffling randomly rearranges all cells within each
variable to further increase confidentiality. For example,
masked variables such as surname or DOB from a sin-
gle record get randomly assigned to different recordsethods
Fig. 3 Example of Privacy Preserving Probabilistic Record Linkage (P3RL) masking and shuffling procedures
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longer belong to the same person, Fig. 3). If only masking
is used, it is possible for site C to give sites feedback about
inconsistencies in the raw data so the data can be updated
before the next step in P3RL is performed.
Figure 3 demonstrates the masking and shuffling proce-
dures. For example, the masked data reveal that ID 12 has
two surnames in the same variable, ID 927 has two sur-
names in separated fields and uses language specific um-
lauts. In ID 931 a name with numbers, which might stand
for “DCO 1998 =Death certificate only – year 1998”, is
disclosed and can be corrected during data cleaning. ID
927 has a 1-digit number prefixed by a dash for the zip
code, which could be a code for missing value. The
masked birthdates uncover different order of year, month
and day, which has to be processed into a single format.
Pre-processing templates
The aim of using templates for pre-processing is to guar-
antee similar quality and format of linkage variables afterdata cleaning at each individual site. This is achieved by
controlling the data cleaning process with customized
pre-processing templates. Templates are created at site
C using the information retrieved from the masked data
without seeing the plain content. For our projects site-
specific templates were created using KNIME Desktop,
version 2.7.4 [31, 32]. KNIME is an open source data
analytics platform for data mining but any suitable plat-
form or programming language can be used. The pre-
processing template consists of a series of data cleaning
rules mainly performed using Java regular expressions
[33, 34]. Selected basic rules of a pre-processing tem-
plate and an example of pre-processing names and dates
are shown in Fig. 4. The rules standardize names (e.g.
transform language specific and special characters),
manage pre- and postfixes, split multiple names in sep-
arate variables, look up nicknames in gender specific
tables and assign uniform missing value characters.
Pre-processed dates include checks for the order of date
components (e.g. day-month-year vs. month-day-year),
Fig. 4 Example of Privacy Preserving Probabilistic Record Linkage (P3RL) pre-processing data cleaning rules
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and leading zero for numeric month and day. Although
not particular to P3RL, checking the expected order of nu-
meric day and month is not possible if both are <13.
Data cleaning
Data cleaning is required because data from independent
sources may differ in many aspects. For example, the
format of variables may differ or string variables such as
names can be inconsistent due to typographical errors,
use of nicknames or abbreviations, changes due to mar-
riage or pre- and postfixes. Therefore, the application of
consistent data cleaning rules is crucial for any data
warehouse generally [25] and for record linkage particu-
larly [35, 36]. In our P3RL workflow data cleaning is
based on pre-processing templates and takes place at
sites A&B, before encryption. This step is critical as
non-pre-processed linkage variables result in a decreased
linkage proportion because true matches are more fre-
quently missed [22].
Encryption
The aim of encryption is to protect participant privacy
and data confidentiality. Encryption is done at theindividual sites using an automated encryption tool
developed in-house specifically for our P3RL projects.
All linkage variables deemed to be confidential (e.g.
names, DOB) are encrypted while all other non-sensitive
PII (e.g. marital status) are not. In this paper we focus
solely on encryption of name and date variables. Never-
theless, the basic method of P3RL is applicable to other
variable types. Levels of security and variables to be
encrypted will differ from project to project.
Encrypting string variables
For P3RL, standard cryptographic procedures such as
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
[37] cannot be used to encrypt string variables. This is
because even tiny differences in string variables produce
very different HMAC strings that do not match when
compared. For instance, in the case of surnames, the
HMAC for “Grün” 301C365327CA3DB972F53EB4-
CEBC4097F2100A72 is completely different from the
HMAC for “Gruen” 5DAB214A7B66680043B6623FA4-
BE320157EB0E3D. Although “ue” is a common replace-
ment for “ü”, these two surnames would not be identified
as potential links by matching HMAC strings. Import-
antly, name mismatches in health-related data are a
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mine the similarity of encrypted name strings instead of
using exact HMAC match is critical to the accuracy of
P3RL.
To address this problem we encrypt sensitive PII
strings, such as surname, using Bloom filters [14–19].
The use of Bloom filters allows calculation of the simi-
larity of hash codes. Figure 5 shows a detailed example
of surname encryption using field-level Bloom filters. In
brief, Bloom filters are bit arrays of variable pre-
determined length (e.g. 1,000 bits) with all bits initially
set to 0. The string (e.g. surname) to be encrypted is
split into multiple sets of consecutive letters (q-grams).
Based on a secret encryption key a predefined number
of hash functions are applied on each q-gram. Each
resulting hash is then translated to a number represent-
ing a specific bit position on the array where the corre-
sponding bit is changed to 1 [17].
Encrypting dates
For P3RL dates are encrypted using simple HMAC’s.
Because dates are primarily prone to systematic errors
(e.g. swapped day and month, ±1 day differences, trans-
posed numbers like 13 versus 31) they are a common
problem for data linkage. A study with SSN comparing
DOB from different sources found date errors in 6-25 %
of the records [40]. In our work we have found that
17-19 % of all errors in linked DOB are due to ±1 day
differences. To address this, we developed a HMAC
encryption procedure to handle the most common
date errors. It creates two variables, one with plain
year and the second with encrypted day, month, full
date and full date ±1 day in different sections.Fig. 5 Example of Bloom filter encryption for surname (bigrams, two hash-Automated encryption tool
The P3RL encryption tool enables data managers at site A
and B to encrypt the confidential PII semi-automatically
with Bloom filters or HMAC’s. Before starting the encryp-
tion, data custodians at site A and B agree on a secret en-
cryption key and a secret test word. The secret key used
to generate project-specific hash functions is entered
manually at site A and B. First, the secret test word is
encrypted using the secret encryption key and is stored as
the encryption validation file. Then the confidential link-
age variables are encrypted. Encrypted string variables like
names are stored as hex coded strings. Four bits of the
Bloom filter are translated into one character representing
a hex coded number 0 to F to reduce the amount of data
(Fig. 5). Finally, the encrypted and unencrypted linkage
variables together with the encryption validation file are
sent to the linkage center on a secured portable data
medium without disclosure of the encryption key.
Probabilistic record linkage
The last step in the P3RL method is probabilistic record
linkage. However, before linkage begins site C must
verify that the encryption was performed uniformly at
site A and B. If the validation files from site A and B do
not match the encryption must be redone before linkage
can begin.
We performed probabilistic record linkage using the
Generalized Record Linkage System (GRLS), developed
by Statistics Canada [41]. We enhanced GRLS by adding
additional macros to handle Bloom filters. Similarity of
the PII Bloom filter encrypted strings was calculated
within GRLS as a Dice coefficient [17, 36] with a range
from zero (no similarity) to one (full match). Beforefunctions, Bloom filter length 28 bits)
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(Fig. 5) are re-converted into bit arrays for bitwise com-
parison. GRLS compared all potential site A and B pairs
categorizing the probability of a match based on thresh-
old weights as full agreement, partial agreement or
disagreement.
Comparison of encrypted string variables was done in
three steps. First Bloom filters were compared for full
agreement. If not matched then Dice coefficients with
different cut-offs representing different levels of similar-
ity (i.e. partial agreement or disagreement) were com-
pared. Lastly, string variables were checked for name
transpositions (e.g. swapped first and surname). Dates
were also compared in several steps for common errors:
(1) plain text year with encrypted day and month for full
agreement, (2) encrypted day and month for swapped
day and month, (3) encrypted full date and encrypted
±1 day date for ±1 day differences and (4) 1 digit error
and transposed numbers in plain year. Additional vari-
ables, beyond what is described herein (e.g. addresses),
can easily be included in P3RL. Once completed, the link
table and the linkage report (i.e. optional information
about the linkage quality) is sent to site A and B. Site C
deletes all data after the linkage is concluded.
Ethics
In this paper we describe the P3RL method. No patients
were involved and no real data were used, therefore, no
ethical approval was needed.
Discussion
P3RL is a collection of techniques to perform probabilis-
tic record linkage using encrypted sensitive PII data
without breaching the confidentiality of the research
participants. This paper describes in detail the P3RL
method that we have successfully employed for our
health-related linkage projects. The implementation of
P3RL has allowed reuse of existing health-related data to
efficiently answer new and innovative epidemiologic
research questions. Furthermore, our P3RL method in-
cludes original pre-processing techniques (i.e. masking)
that improve the accuracy of linkage procedures. Not-
ably, P3RL is easily customizable and thus applicable in
a wide variety of other settings facing similar challenges
with the goal of reusing existing data to answer novel re-
search questions.
We faced two main challenges in developing a usable
P3RL method. First, we needed to strike a balance be-
tween the highly sophisticated methods used in informa-
tion technology (IT) research and the resources and
expertise commonly available in epidemiologic research
settings. Second, it was imperative to include techniques
that maintained the privacy of PII data throughout the
entire P3RL process. The P3RL method described hereinovercomes both of these major challenges resulting in a
novel and practical solution for linking existing data
while preserving participant confidentiality.
Privacy protection using encryption has been extensively
researched in the computer science and IT literature.
Recently, there have been several studies specifically
investigating potential string comparisons using priv-
acy protection measures for record linkage projects
[9, 11–13, 42–46]. The methods investigated differ by
the quality of the links achieved, the computational
requirements and the level of security of the encryp-
tion [13, 44]. These methods are generally classified
into two-party and three-party protocols [44, 47, 48].
In two-party protocols, two sites apply complex en-
cryption techniques to ensure that no sensitive PII is
revealed during the linkage procedures. Two-party
protocols are highly secure, as there is no possibility
of collusion between one of the sites and the third
party. However, they generally are more computation-
ally intensive, therefore, not always feasible for very
large datasets [18]. Furthermore, two-party protocols
require specific encryption and linkage expertise at
the participating sites that may not be available in ep-
idemiologic research settings. Three-party protocols,
as described in this paper for P3RL, require a third
trusted partner to function as the independent linkage
center [20, 36, 42]. The expertise, computing power and
control of the linkage process is the primary responsibility
of the linkage center. In best practice the linkage center is
trained in privacy and security issues and has specialized
dedicated resources not likely to be found in traditional
epidemiologic research settings. In P3RL the linkage cen-
ter provides simple tools for the sites for pre-processing
and encryption and implements all the probabilistic rec-
ord linkage procedure. As a result, three-party protocols
may be more practicable and easily accepted in epidemio-
logic research settings.
There are several strengths associated with using our
P3RL method for epidemiologic research. We chose
Bloom filters for encrypting PII string variables and Dice
coefficients to calculate the similarity of the encrypted
strings. Research confirms that Bloom Filters [14] are a
feasible and efficient method for P3RL, that results in a
high quality linkage with reasonable security [13, 17–19].
Bloom filter research has shown similar results to linkage
with non-encrypted string variables and superiority to
linkage with phonetic encodings [17]. Another strength of
P3RL is that the method was developed for health-related
research settings, where local personnel often has limited
resources, scarce experience in data cleaning and almost
never experience in record linkage procedures. We use
semi-automated tools, which are easily applied at individ-
ual sites and still maintain the participants’ privacy and
yield high record linkage quality. To our best knowledge,
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tion about the structure of data without revealing the
plain content, has not been used in previous research.
This step is pivotal for P3RL projects because it allows use
of site-specific templates, which facilitate high quality data
cleaning at the individual sites without disclosing plain
data to the record linkage center. Site-specific templates
are crucial, as pre-processing of variables is necessary for
high linkage quality, yet data collection at independent
sites is rarely standardized [25, 35, 36, 49]. Importantly,
which pre-processing procedures to apply and how much
pre-processing improves linkage quality before it leads to
false positive links is under debate [50, 51]. Many factors
such as language specific characteristics (e.g. special char-
acters, common pre- or postfixes) call for individual pre-
processing procedures and hamper the development of a
gold standard for pre-processing. Another novel step is
the validation before the record linkage: As the record
linkage center cannot supervise the encryption process at
the sites A&B, we included a validation file, which allows
to check if both sites applied the same secret key and
therefore made the encrypted data comparable, before site
C starts the linkage procedures.
Our P3RL method has some limitations. Protecting
patient's confidentiality using encryption methods has its
price. Masking, pre-processing and encrypting at indi-
vidual sites and the P3RL linkage process itself are far
more time and (human) resource consuming compared
to a plain record linkage performed at the record linkage
center. Since linkage of encrypted names using Bloom
filters is computationally intensive, blocking or filtering
techniques to reduce the amount of potential pairs (thusTable 1 P3RL - Computational requirements of Masking and Shufflin
table A and 50,000 records table B)
Step Linkage type
Plain P3RL - En
Mask and shuffle - 11 variab
5 sec
Pre-processing
(of variables to be encrypted, source
data totally consists of 13 variables)
- 3 name v
- > 6 pre-
7 min 54
Encryption
(source data totally consists of 13 variables)





(filter to reduce potential pairs to 40 Mio)
13 plain variables,
10 rules










Tests were performed on Desktop Computer with Intel® Xeon® CPU, 4 cores, 64-bit,
estimates were derived using in-house software for masking and encryption, KNIME
in desktop version (former GRLS), developed by Statistics Canada
Estimates may vary widely using other programs and/or hardwarethe number of required comparisons) is crucial. Ideally
the number of potential pairs should be limited to about
100 million for desktop systems. But caution is needed in
trying to estimate computational requirements (Table 1)
because estimates depend on the systems and software
used for P3RL applications. P3RL projects assume that the
sites can manage additional workload, as this method
transfers part of the procedures from the linkage center to
the sites. Another limitation is that encrypted linkage as in
P3RL restricts date comparisons to the most common er-
rors and cannot implement as many date comparisons
possible in standard probabilistic linkage projects. For
example, swapped digits and single wrong digits in day or
month cannot be found without weakening the security of
the encryption substantially. The security of any encryp-
tion method is always an issue. P3RL method is not
designed with any fixed security level. It depends on nego-
tiations between sites and the encryption methods used.
Our P3RL method using Bloom filters was developed
for research purposes and has not been evaluated for
organizational governance requirements. However, Bloom
filters have been described and evaluated repeatedly else-
where. They have been scrutinized and attacked [52, 53]
using cryptanalysis and a constraint satisfaction problem
(CSP) attack. Even though a frequency attack of Bloom fil-
ter encryptions seems not to be completely impossible,
the study relies on many assumptions a potential adver-
sary would not find in real world situations, as the authors
declare themselves [52]. Furthermore, the assumptions in
epidemiological research are different from those in IT re-
search. The privacy of the participants is regulated by
ethic review boards designed to protect disclosure to non-g, Pre-processing (100,000 records) and Linkage (100,000 records
crypted names P3RL - Encrypted dates
les to mask and shuffle 11 variables to mask and shuffle
5 sec
ariables to pre-process
processed name variables built
sec
2 date variables to pre-process
- > 2 pre-processed date variables built
35 sec
ariables to encrypt (trigrams,
functions, bit array size 800)
sec
2 date variables to encrypt






2 encrypted date variables




3 GHz, 12 GB RAM, Windows 7 Professional 64 bit operating system. These
for pre-processing and G-LINK for linkage. G-LINK is the latest linkage software
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Another security issue is the automatic data cleaning and
encrypting at sites A and B, where unencrypted data
are exported from their main database and stored on
notebooks provided by the linkage center with the pre-
processing and encrypting tools installed. To overcome
this limitation and to ensure that the unencrypted data
never leave site A or B, the data custodians can either
format the hard drive themselves or destroy the drive
used for P3RL. Only a secured mobile device (e.g. USB
stick) with the extracted and encrypted data is sent
back to the linkage center. Another weakness of priv-
acy preserving linkage methods is that the clerical re-
view of potential but uncertain links is not possible
with encrypted variables [49].
Conclusion
P3RL facilitates the linkage of existing datasets in health-
related research settings using automated pre-processing
and encrypting to fully protect PII. The privacy of PII is
preserved at all times ensuring participant confidentiality
is protected. As a result, P3RL expands possibilities for
data reuse in settings where regulations restrict access to
the PII necessary to link existing health-related datasets.
We describe the P3RL method for epidemiological re-
search, however, P3RL is suitable for any other settings
with similar challenges. Future studies examining the val-
idity and accuracy of the P3RL method are warranted.
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